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THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS: 
DOES “ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE TO” REQUIRE 
CAUSATION? 
Levi M. Klinger-Christiansen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the Supreme Court took on the issue of minimum contacts 
personal jurisdiction for the first time since 1988.  The two cases it heard, 
J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, resulted in opinions limiting the scope of both specific and 
general jurisdiction.1  This trend of diminishing the Court’s minimum 
contacts jurisprudence has continued throughout the decade, leading to the 
Court’s 2017 opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
California.2  The Bristol-Myers opinion also marked a first.  It served as the 
first time the Court analyzed the “nexus requirement” of specific 
jurisdiction since the Court recognized the difference between general and 
specific jurisdiction in Helicopteros De Colombia v. Hall over thirty years 
earlier.3  Specifically, the question of when a plaintiff’s claim, “arise[s] out 
of or relate[s] to the [defendant’s] activities in the forum state.”4 
Bristol-Myers presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
provide much needed clarification to the nexus requirement after the Court 
left the meaning of the nexus requirement rather unclear in Helicopteros.  
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New Jersey.  I would like to thank Professor Denis McLaughlin for his insightful and 
careful guidance through the process of writing this Comment.  Additionally, thank you 
Mom, George, and Jackie for your unconditional love and support. 
 1  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).  
 2  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).  
 3  Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).  To assert 
specific jurisdiction a court must first find that the defendant had “certain minimum contacts 
with [the forum].”  Id.  (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  
Second, the court must also find the “cause of action [to] arise out of or relate to [the 
defendant’s] activities in the forum state.”  Id.  Some courts and commenters use the term 
“nexus requirement” to refer to the second requirement; this Comment will borrow that 
language.  See, e.g., Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 332 (D.C. 2000); 
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38 
IND. L. REV. 343, 348 (2005).  
 4  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.  
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As a result, courts and commenters have provided various interpretations of 
the nexus requirement’s meaning since Helicopteros.  Ultimately, Bristol-
Myers did not clarify every aspect of the nexus requirement’s meaning, 
leaving many competing interpretations untouched.  On the other hand, 
despite the Court’s insistence that it decided Bristol-Myers on “settled 
principles of personal jurisdiction,” this Comment suggests that the opinion 
narrowed the understanding of what the nexus requirement means.5 
This Comment argues that Bristol-Myers has largely narrowed the 
nexus requirement to require at-least but-for causation between the 
plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum contacts in most situations;6 
however, not in every situation.  Language from Bristol-Myers creates 
space for a narrow circumstance in which a non-causal connection between 
the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum contacts may remain viable.  
This narrow circumstance falls directly in line with Professor Sandstrom 
Simard’s concept of “hybrid jurisdiction.”7  Furthermore, not only does this 
approach remain potentially viable, but the Court should also embrace it in 
the interest of fairness.8 
Because an in-depth understanding of the nexus requirement is 
necessary to understand the implication of Bristol-Myers, Part II of this 
 
 5  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783.  
 6  But-for causation “is satisfied when the plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen in the 
absence of the defendant’s contacts” with the forum state.  16 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 
108.42(7)(b) (Mathew Bender 3d Ed.).  Courts have different approaches on what kind of 
causation between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s injury the Due Process Clause 
requires.  See infra Sec. III. A and B.  
 7  Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General 
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but is it Constitutional?, CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559 
(1998).  Professor Sandstrom Simard describes “hybrid jurisdiction” as a combination of the 
“requirements of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction without satisfying either type 
of jurisdiction completely,” though ultimately arguing that “hybrid jurisdiction may satisfy 
the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction and thus be constitutional.”  Id. at 563.  This 
Comment suggests that the Bristol-Myers opinion has further bolstered the argument for 
hybrid jurisdiction’s constitutionality.  
 8  On January 17, 2020, the United States Supreme Court granted petitions for 
certiorari on two State Supreme Court cases coming out of Minnesota and Montana.  See 
Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL 
254152 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-369); Ford Motor Co., v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 
443 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL 254155 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-
368).  The resolution of these two cases, Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial 
District Court and Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., which the United States Supreme Court 
has consolidated into one case, will necessarily require answering the question posed by this 
Comment: does “arise out of or relate to” require causation? Significantly, both the 
Minnesota and Montana Supreme Courts, in their respective opinions, accepted the viability 
of a non-causal test for the nexus requirement, with both opinions generally tracking the 
function of hybrid jurisdiction.  See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 751–55; Ford, 443 P.3d at 
414–17.  Thus, the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to embrace hybrid jurisdiction 
as a valid test under the nexus requirement, which this Comment suggests would be a 
prudent decision. See infra Sec. V.B.  
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Comment will provide an overview of the minimum contacts and nexus 
requirements of specific jurisdiction.  This section will look to Justice 
Brennan’s dissent in Helicopteros as a guiding framework for the rest of 
the Comment.  Next, because the Court left the nexus requirement unclear 
in Helicopteros, Part III will survey the various interpretations that have 
arisen both before and after Helicopteros.  This is also necessary for 
understanding the landscape that Bristol-Myers has now re-shaped.  Part IV 
will then provide a review of the Bristol-Myers opinion.  Part V will 
provide an analysis of what Bristol-Myers has changed.  Part VI will argue 
why the Court should embrace hybrid jurisdiction.  Part VII will discuss 
questions that require further examination if the Court does embrace hybrid 
jurisdiction. Finally, Part VIII will summarize and conclude. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
A.  The Minimum Contacts Requirement 
In International Shoe v. Washington, the Supreme Court first 
established the “minimum contacts” test as a constitutionally valid basis for 
acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant.9 The Court stated, “due 
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with [the forum].”10 
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court further emphasized that in order to 
acquire personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts “it is essential in 
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”11  In effect, this 
requirement means, “the unilateral activity of [plaintiffs] who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 
contact with the forum State.”12  In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the 
Court further noted that “whether the defendant purposefully established 
‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State” is the “constitutional touchstone” 
to a court’s valid assertion of personal jurisdiction through minimum 
contacts.13  This minimum contact requirement constitutes the first 
requirement of specific personal jurisdiction.14 
 
 9  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added).  
 10  Id. 
 11  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  
 12  Id.  
 13  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 
U.S. at 316.).  
 14  See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 n.8 (1984) 
(stating that due process requires “‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum]’” and then 
KLINGER-CHRISTIANSEN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2020  7:31 PM 
1148 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1145 
B.  The Nexus Requirement 
Starting with International Shoe, the Supreme Court hinted at the 
existence of two types of personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts.15  
The Court explained: 
[T]o the extent that a [defendant] exercises the privilege of 
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and 
protection of the laws of that state.  The exercise of that privilege 
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise 
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a 
procedure which requires the [defendant] to respond to a suit 
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to 
be undue.16 
The Court also stated, however, that “there have been instances in which 
the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of 
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”17  
Hence, the Court suggested two situations in which a forum may be able to 
assert personal jurisdiction by means of minimum contacts: one where the 
claim is connected to the defendant’s activity in the forum and one where it 
is not.18  Professors Von Mehren and Trautman defined the former as 
“specific jurisdiction” and the latter as “general jurisdiction.”19 
The Supreme Court officially adopted Professors Von Mehren and 
Trautman’s framework in Helicopteros.20  The case was a wrongful death 
action resulting from a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four American 
citizens.21  The defendant helicopter company, Helicol, was a Colombian 
corporation that provided helicopter transportation in South America for a 
pipeline project by the decedents’ employer.22  The defendant purchased 
the helicopter involved in the crash in Texas.23  The defendant and the 
decedents’ employer also negotiated the helicopter transportation contract 
in Texas that resulted in the fatal crash in Peru.24  Furthermore, the 
 
noting that when such contacts are coupled with the nexus requirement “the State is 
exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.)).  
 15  See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 16  Id.  
 17  Id. at 318.  
 18  See id.  
 19  Arthur Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).  
 20  Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984).  
 21  Id. at 410. 
 22  Id. at 409.  
 23  Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 24  Id. at 410–11.  
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defendant “sent prospective pilots to Fort Worth[, Texas] for training,” and 
the pilot who crashed the helicopter in question received his training in 
Texas.25  The families of the American citizens sued the foreign helicopter 
company in Texas state court.26 
The Court used this case as an opportunity to adopt Professors Von 
Mehren and Trautman’s concepts of “specific” and “general” jurisdiction.27  
The Court stated that “when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the 
defendant.”28  Conversely, the Court then explained that “when a State 
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of 
or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been 
said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”29 
With the adoption of Professors Von Mehren and Trautman’s 
framework, the nexus requirement officially entered the Court’s minimum 
contacts jurisprudence and serves as the second requirement for specific 
jurisdiction.30  The Court, however, did not go any further in attempting to 
clarify what the nexus requirement actually means; rather, “[b]ecause the 
parties [did not] argue[] any relationship between the cause of action and 
Helicol’s contacts with the State of Texas [the Court] assert[ed] no ‘view’ 
with respect to that issue.”31  The Court only considered “whether 
[Helicol’s contacts with Texas] constitut[ed] the kind of continuous and 
systematic general business contact” necessary to assert general 
jurisdiction, and ultimately held that Helicol’s contacts were not sufficient 
to assert general jurisdiction.32  Thus, the Court declined to answer: 
(1) whether the terms ‘arising out of’ and ‘related to’ describe 
different connections between a cause of action and a 
defendant’s contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie 
between a cause of action and a defendant’s contacts with a 
forum is necessary to a determination that either connection 
 
 25  Id. at 411; id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Helicol had other contacts with Texas 
including the purchasing of “helicopters (approximately 80% of its fleet), spare parts, and 
accessories for more than $4 million from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth.”  Id. at 
411.   
 26  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 412.  
 27  Id. at 414 nn.8–9. 
 28  Id. at 414 n.8 (citing Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144–64). 
 29  Id. at 414 n.9 (citing Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144–64). 
 30  See id. at 414.   
 31  Id. at 415 n.10.  Justice Brennan contested this finding.  Id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Nor do I agree with the Court that the respondents have conceded that their 
claims are not related to Helicol’s activities within the State of Texas.”).  
 32  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.  
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exists.33 
This Comment seeks to pose potential answers to both of those 
questions.  Justice Brennan’s dissent, in which he argued that Texas could 
have asserted specific jurisdiction, provides a suitable starting point for this 
task.34  On the question of specific jurisdiction, Justice Brennan first took 
issue with the majority for not considering “any distinction between 
contacts that are ‘related to’ the underlying cause of action and contacts 
that ‘give rise’ to the underlying cause of action.”35  In distinguishing the 
two phrases, Justice Brennan agreed that the “cause of action did not 
formally ‘arise out of’ specific activities initiated by Helicol in the State of 
Texas.”36 
Justice Brennan, however, argued that the “relate to” phrase could 
mean something much different.  Though not defining the parameters of 
the phrase “relate to,” Justice Brennan’s application of the phrase to the 
facts of Helicopteros suggested he viewed the phrase as allowing specific 
jurisdiction when there is but-for causation between the plaintiff’s claim 
and the defendant’s contacts with the forum.37  This is so because Justice 
Brennan noted that the pilot involved in the crash acquired his training in 
Texas, Helicol negotiated the contract in Texas, and Helicol bought the 
particular helicopter involved in the Peru crash in Texas.38  From these 
contacts Justice Brennan argued “[t]his is simply not a case, therefore, in 
which a state court has asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
on the basis of wholly unrelated contacts with the forum.”39 
Unfortunately, aside from finding that the Helicol’s contacts in Texas 
did in fact “relate to” the cause of action, Justice Brennan did not further 
 
 33  Id. at 415 n.10.  
 34  Id. at 424 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 35  Id. at 425.  
 36  Id.  Justice Brennan did not explicitly define what he meant for a “cause of action to 
formally ar[i]se out of the defendant’s contacts with the State,” but his criticism of limiting 
specific jurisdiction to such instances shed light on his formulation of the term.  Id.  He 
argued that “limiting specific jurisdiction of a forum” to causes of action that formally arise 
out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum “would subject constitutional standards under 
the Due Process Clause to the vagaries of the substantive law or pleading requirements of 
each State.”  Id.  In criticizing such a result, Justice Brennan noted that  “if the respondents 
had simply added an allegation of negligence in the training provided for the Helicol pilot, 
then presumably the [majority] would [have] concede[d] that the specific jurisdiction of the 
Texas courts was applicable.”  Id. at 427. 
 37  Id. at 425–26.  
 38  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 426. 
 39  Id.  Justice Brennan also argued that the jury in the original Texas trial had 
“specifically found that ‘the pilot failed to keep the helicopter under proper control,’ 
[and] . . . that ‘such flying was negligence’ . . . .”  Id. at 426 n.4.  This further solidifies that 
Justice Brennan’s theory of “relate to” in this particular case was based on broad but-for 
causation.   
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clarify or promulgate an operative test to define any parameters of how far 
a court can go in finding that a defendant’s contacts with a forum “relate 
to” the plaintiff’s injury.  Therefore, while Justice Brennan’s dissent 
provided some analysis of the nexus requirement and a way of separating 
the requirement’s two key phrases, the dissent still left the nexus 
requirement extremely broad and unclear.  The Court did not analyze the 
application of the nexus requirement again until Bristol-Myers.40 
III.  VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
The Supreme Court has never clarified what it means for a plaintiff’s 
claim to “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
State.  As a result, lower courts and commenters have filled the void with 
varying interpretations of the nexus requirement.  This Comment will use 
Justice Brennan’s separation of “arise out of” and “relate to” as a way of 
categorizing these different interpretations.  Under Justice Brennan’s lens, 
most of these interpretations can be classified as an application of “relate 
to,” as opposed to “arise out of.”  Hence, most of these interpretations 
allow a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant even when an 
element of a claim does not formally “arise out of” the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum State as Justice Brennan’s articulation of “arise out of” 
requires.41  This expansion of “relate to” is largely in response to an issue 
Professor Richman aptly described: 
An issue that surfaces from time to time is whether jurisdiction is 
proper in a case that falls between these two paradigms [general 
and specific jurisdiction]: one where the defendant has 
substantial contacts with the forum, but not so many as to justify 
general jurisdiction, and where the plaintiff’s cause of action 
does not arise out of the defendant’s forum activities, although it 
is not totally unrelated to them.42 
 Courts and commenters have tackled this issue by applying various 
interpretations of what the nexus requirement can mean.  This section 
discusses the three various interpretations of the nexus requirement, which 
include (A) the two causation approaches, (i) but-for causation and (ii) 
 
 40  To be sure, the Court did describe the nexus requirement in both Goodyear and 
Daimler AG v. Bauman.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
923–24 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014).  Bristol-Myers, 
however, was the first time the Court’s holding required an application of the nexus 
requirement.  See infra Sec. IV.  
 41  See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 424.  Note that courts do not necessarily rely on Justice 
Brennan’s framework, often referring to “arise out of or relate to” as one standard.  This 
Comment simply uses Justice Brennan’s framework as a useful guide and classification 
system.  
 42  William M. Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between 
General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1337 (1984).  
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proximate causation, and (B) the similarity approach.43  This section then 
considers two scholarly contributions toward analyzing the nexus 
requirement: (C) the sliding scale, and (D) hybrid jurisdiction. 
A.  The Causation Approaches 
The Courts of Appeals for each of the federal circuits use some form 
of causation as the basis of their nexus requirement analysis.44  Courts and 
commenters have generally narrowed the causal tests into two major 
categories: but-for causation and proximate causation.45  As noted above, 
but-for causation is satisfied when the plaintiff’s claim would not have 
arisen but-for the defendant’s contacts with the forum.46  Proximate 
causation, on the other hand, requires a closer connection between the 
plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s contacts with the forum; in many 
ways it more closely resembles Justice Brennan’s formulation of “arise out 
of.” 
1.  But-for causation 
But-for causation uses a relaxed causal test.47  As the name suggests, 
“this standard is satisfied when the plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen 
in the absence of the defendant’s contacts.”48  Hence, but-for causation 
resembles the analysis Justice Brennan performed in his Helicopteros 
dissent.49  The Ninth Circuit is the primary adherent to this test.50 
The Ninth’s Circuit’s analysis in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines 
provides a classic example of but-for causation.51  The case involved an 
injury the plaintiff sustained while on a cruise.52  The plaintiff purchased a 
ticket for the cruise through a sales agent in the plaintiff’s home state of 
Washington; while on the cruise in international waters off the coast of 
 
 43  Bender, supra note 6 (“Three general approaches have emerged.”).  These 
approaches are but-for causation, proximate causation, and the “substantial connection” or 
the “discernable relationship standard.”  Id.  Under the third approach, “causation is of no 
special importance.”  Id.  I have labeled the third approach the “similarity approach.”  
 44  See id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id.  
 47  O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A . . . more 
relaxed test requires only ‘but-for’ causation.”).   
 48  Id. (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385–86 (9th Cir. 1990)).  
 49  See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425–26 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50  Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) rev’d on other 
grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Bender, supra note 6. 
 51  See Shute, 897 F.2d at 379. 
 52  Id.  
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Mexico, the plaintiff slipped and injured herself.53  The plaintiff sued 
Carnival Cruise in the federal district court in Washington State.54  Carnival 
Cruise argued that while it had contacts in Washington, the claim did not 
“arise out of or relate to” those contacts because the injury occurred in 
international waters off the coast of Mexico.55  The district court agreed 
and dismissed the case on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction.56  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed.57 
In its personal jurisdiction analysis, the Ninth Circuit first asserted 
that Carnival Cruise had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of 
Washington, as Carnival Cruise reached out to the individuals in the state 
to sell cruise tickets, advertised on local media, and promoted its cruises 
through in-state travel agents.58 
The Ninth Circuit then moved to its analysis of the nexus 
requirement.59  The court first rejected the “stringent standard of causation” 
used by the First and Eighth Circuits, which Carnival Cruise urged the 
Ninth Circuit to employ as well.60  Instead, the court applied the but-for 
causation test, finding that “[i]n the absence of Carnival’s activity, the 
Shutes would not have taken the cruise, and Mrs. Shute’s injury would not 
have occurred.”61  The court found a substantial nexus because “[i]t was 
Carnival’s forum-related activities that put the parties within ‘tortious 
striking distance’ of one another.”62  Under Justice Brennan’s framework, 
this test necessarily falls under “relate to,” because it does not require that 
an element of the claim—such as duty, breach or proximate causation—to 
 
 53  Id.  
 54  Id. at 377. 
 55  See id. at 379. 
 56  Id.   
 57  Shute, 897 F.2d at 379. 
 58  Id. at 382 (“[I]t is difficult to conclude that Carnival did not purposefully avail itself 
of the laws of Washington.  It advertised in local media, promoted its cruises through 
brochures sent to travel agents in that state, and paid a commission on sales of cruises in that 
state.”).  
 59  Id. at 383 (“[T]he claim must ‘arise out of’ the defendant’s forum-related 
activities.”).  Note that the Ninth Circuit only used the terms “arise out of” and not “relate 
to,” suggesting how some courts do not necessarily see a difference between these terms.  
This further demonstrates the confusion over the nexus requirement, as there is no clearly 
established vocabulary that courts use when referring to the nexus requirement.  
 60  Id. (citing Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1986); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life 
& Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983)).  The court then agreed that “[w]ere 
this court to apply the ‘arising from’ analysis of Marino and Pearrow to this case, we would 
conclude that Mrs. Shute’s fall did not arise out of Carnival’s solicitation of business in 
Washington.”  Id.  
 61  Id. at 386.  
 62  Id.  
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formally arise out the defendant’s forum contacts.63 
2.  Proximate Causation 
In United Electric, Radio & Machine Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. 
Corp., the First Circuit articulated a more stringent interpretation of the 
nexus requirement under the label of proximate causation.64  The court 
noted that “we steadfastly reject the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
whenever the connection between the cause of action and the defendant’s 
forum-state contacts seems attenuated and indirect.”65  Rather, the First 
Circuit requires the defendant’s forum contacts to “form an ‘important, or 
[at least] material, element of proof’ in the plaintiff’s case.”66  Hence, the 
court has “suggested an analogy between the [nexus] requirement and the 
binary concept of causation in tort law under which both elements—[but-
for causation] and legal cause (i.e., the defendant’s in-state conduct gave 
birth to the cause of action)—must be satisfied to find causation sufficient 
to support specific jurisdiction.”67 
The federal district court of Massachusetts’s opinion in Rodriguez v. 
Samsung Electronics Co., provides a useful modern application of the 
proximate causation test articulated in United Electric.68  This case 
involved an employee of Axcelis Technologies, Inc. (“Axcelis-US”) who 
sued Samsung after he sustained permanent injuries when he traveled to 
Korea to install an ion implanter on Samsung premises.69  During 
discovery, Samsung indicated that, a separate company, Axcelis-Korea, 
supervised and directed the installation.70  Axcelis-Korea is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Axcelis-US with its principal place of business in 
Korea, providing sales and support services in both Korea and China.71  
Plaintiff then amended his complaint to include Axcelis-Korea; the 
subsidiary filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.72 
The district court interestingly began its analysis with the nexus 
requirement rather than the minimum contacts requirement.73  Applying the 
 
 63  See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425–27 (1984). 
 64  United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 
1089 (1st Cir. 1992).  
 65  Id.  
 66  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st 
Cir. 1986)).  
 67  Id.  
 68  Rodriguez v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 827 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 2011).  
 69  Id. at 50.  
 70  Id.  
 71  Id.  
 72  Id.  
 73  Id. at 51.  After finding that specific jurisdiction did not exist under the nexus 
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proximate causation test, the court first noted that “Axcelis-Korea’s in-state 
contract with Axcelis-US was surely a but-for cause of Rodriguez’s 
injury.”74  Nonetheless, the court found that proximate causation did not 
exist because the plaintiff’s “negligence claim sounds in tort, not contract, 
and it arose directly out of allegedly tortious conduct which occurred 
entirely in Korea.”75  Hence, Axcelis-Korea’s “limited contacts with 
Massachusetts [were] not . . . an important or material element of proof in 
plaintiffs’ case.”76 
The proximate causation test is quite similar to Professor Brilmayer’s 
“substantive relevance” test.77  Professor Brilmayer’s test provides that, 
“[a] contact is related to the controversy if it is the geographical 
qualification of a fact relevant to the merits.”78  This means that a specific 
contact must be relevant to an element of the claim the plaintiff asserts.79  
For example, had the contract in Rodriguez included a clause imposing a 
duty of reasonable care on Axcelis-Korea, the duty element of the 
negligence claim may have been sufficiently linked to the contract in 
Massachusetts and therefore allow for specific jurisdiction in the forum.  
Thus, the proximate causation test and the substantive relevance test fall 
under Justice Brenan’s definition of “arise out of,” as both require that a 
formal element of the claim arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum.80 
 
requirement, the court then performed a minimum contacts analysis and found that Axcelis-
Korea did not even have sufficient minimum contacts with Massachusetts.  Id. at 52.  This is 
interesting because typically courts analyze the minimum contacts requirement first, likely 
because it is often an easier inquiry.  
 74  Rodriguez, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (“Had Axcelis-Korea not entered into a contract in 
Massachusetts with Axcelis-US to perform services in Korea, its managers would not have 
been present at Samsung’s facility to supervise the installation and Rodriguez would not 
have been injured as a result of their allegedly negligent acts or omissions.”). 
 75  Id.  
 76  Id.  
 77  Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court 
Jurisdiction, 77 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82 (1980).  See also O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 
Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 318–19 (3d. Cir. 2007) (“The most restrictive standard is the ‘proximate 
cause’ or ‘substantive relevance’ test.”) (citing id.).  Other commenters, however, disagree 
with this conflation.  Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New 
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 207, 237 (2014) (noting the 
“erroneous conflation of [substantive relevance] with the proximate cause approach adopted 
by some lower courts and commentators . . . .”).  
 78  Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 82.  
 79  Id. 
 80  O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 319 (“Justice Brennan, dissenting in Helicopteros, similarly 
described [proximate causation or substantive relevance] as a requirement that ‘the cause of 
action . . . formally “arise out of” the [defendant’s] contacts.’”) (quoting Helicopteros 
Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 426–27 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).  
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B.  The Similarity Approach 
The similarity approach is the broadest possible reading of “relate to,” 
as it does not require a causal connection between the plaintiff’s claim and 
the defendant’s contacts at all.81  Though rejecting it outright, Professor 
Brilmayer explains that the similarity approach authorizes a forum to assert 
specific jurisdiction over a defendant for an injury that occurred outside the 
forum if there is a “similarity between the forum activity and the activity 
which gave rise to the controversy.”82 
While none of the Courts of Appeals currently use a similarity 
approach,83 Professor Brilmayer pointed to an instance where the California 
Supreme Court seemed to do so.84  In Cornelison v. Chaney, the California 
Supreme Court upheld specific jurisdiction over a defendant truck driver 
who delivered goods into California approximately twenty times per year 
for an injury that the driver caused in Nevada while he was on his way to 
California.85  After finding that the truck driver had minimum contacts with 
California, but not enough to establish general jurisdiction,86 the court 
explained that its “inquiry is directed to whether plaintiff’s cause of 
action . . . arises out of or has a substantial connection with a business 
relationship defendant has purposefully established with California.”87  The 
court then held “[t]he accident arose out of the driving of a truck, the very 
activity which was the essential basis of defendant’s contacts with this 
state[,]” and then concluded that this created a “substantial connection” 
between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s cause of 
action.88 
Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno presents another example of the 
similarity approach.  In this case, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals used what it called the “discernible relationship” test.89  The case 
 
 81  Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 83.  
 82  Id. 
 83  Bender, supra note 6. 
 84  Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 83.  
 85  Cornelison v. Chaney, 545 P.2d 264, 266 (Cal. 1976).  
 86  Id. at 267 (“In our view, these contacts are not sufficient to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction over defendant without regard to whether plaintiff’s cause of action is relevant 
to California activity.”).  
 87  Id. (emphasis added).  
 88  Id. at 268.  
 89  Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335 (D.C. 2000).  This test is 
directly analogous to the “substantial connection” test used in Cornelison.  Indeed, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals directly cited Cornelison, and then stated that under 
its discernable relationship test, “for the Superior Court to have jurisdiction over Ms. 
Moreno’s claim, the claim had to be related to or substantially connected with Shoppers’ 
advertising activity in the District.”  Id. (emphasis added).  I have labeled both these tests as 
the “similarity approach,” because both tests only seem to require “similarity between the 
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involved a District of Columbia resident who slipped and injured herself at 
a Shoppers store in Maryland.90  Shoppers advertised its stores, located in 
Virginia and Maryland, in the District of Columbia.91  The plaintiff sued in 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.92  On appeal, the court of 
appeals held that jurisdiction over Shoppers was valid because a 
“discernible relationship” existed between Shoppers’s continuous conduct 
in the District of Columbia and the conduct that caused the claim of 
action.93  The court found a “discernable relationship” noting: “it is 
reasonably foreseeable that, as a result of advertising extensively and over 
a substantial period of time in the District’s major circulation newspaper, 
Shoppers could be sued in the District on a claim similar to that filed by 
Ms. Moreno [plaintiff].”94  Hence, the “discernable relationship” test, as 
used in Shoppers, uses similarity as a basis of establishing the nexus 
requirement.  Under Justice Brennan’s framework, the similarity approach 
must fall under Justice Brennan’s definition of “relate to” if it fits into the 
framework at all, as it certainly does not fulfill the requirements of Justice 
Brennan’s definition of “arise out of.” 
C.  The Sliding Scale 
Professor Richman’s solution to the problem of the grey area between 
general and specific jurisdiction is the “sliding scale” approach.95  This test 
can plausibly operate as a supplement to either the causal tests or the 
similarity approach.  The concept rests on the idea of viewing general and 
specific jurisdiction as the opposite poles of a spectrum.96  Across this 
spectrum, Professor Richman considered two key variables: the “extent of 
the defendant’s forum contacts” and the “proximity of the connection 
between those contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.”97  He noted that as the 
 
forum activity and the activity which gave rise to the controversy.”  Brilmayer, supra note 
77, at 83.  It is also worth noting that specific jurisdiction likely could have been asserted in 
this case under a but-for causation theory, but the court explicitly rejected the causal tests in 
favor of the “discernable relationship” test, thus suggesting that this test is less stringent 
than even but-for causation.  Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 335 (“Based upon our review of nexus 
tests [the court discussed but-for causation in this review] . . . we see no reason to deviate 
from . . . our past decisions which have interpreted the ‘arise from’ language of [the District 
of Columbia’s long arm statute] flexibly and synonymously with ‘relate to’ or having a 
‘substantial connection with’ . . . .”).  
 90  Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 323. 
 91  Id.  
 92  Id.  
 93  Id. at 336.  
 94  Id. (emphasis added). 
 95  Richman, supra note 42, at 1345.  
 96  Id. (“The concepts of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are simply the two 
opposite ends of this sliding scale.”). 
 97  Id. 
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defendant’s forum contacts increase, the proximity to the plaintiff’s claim 
may decrease, leading to the one polar extreme of general jurisdiction.98 
On the other hand, as the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, the test 
requires a stronger connection between those contacts in order to assert 
jurisdiction.99  This connection could, of course, be a causal connection.  
As the contacts become stronger, the more attenuated the causal connection 
can be until reaching the point of a highly attenuated, but-for causation; as 
the contacts decrease, perhaps something akin to proximate causation 
would be more appropriate.100  The test, can also conceivably lead to the 
assertion of jurisdiction even when there is not a causal link between the 
plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum activities, or at least so 
attenuated a causal link that a court would not even entertain the assertion 
of personal jurisdiction under a but-for causation analysis. 
Professor Richman provides a factual hypothetical that suggests the 
use of the sliding scale approach when a potentially non-causal relationship 
exists between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.101  
He uses an example of a California resident who regularly uses a drug in 
California.102  The manufacturer advertises and sells the drug in 
California.103  The plaintiff then travels to New York, buys a dosage of the 
drug in New York, and sustains injuries in New York from the drug.104  
The plaintiff sues in California.105  In this example, the defendant’s actions 
in California do not cause the plaintiff’s claim.106  Under the sliding scale 
approach, Professor Richman suggests that the continuous contacts with 
California and the plaintiff’s relationship to California should be enough to 
allow for specific jurisdiction over the drug company.107  Further, because 
the continuous contacts are identical to the actions by the company in New 
York that caused the injury, there would be no unreasonableness or 
 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  See id. (“As the quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts increase, a 
weaker connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is permissible; as the 
quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a stronger connection 
between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is required.”). 
 101  Richman, supra note 42, at 1344.  
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id.  Of course, one can argue that the plaintiff would not have bought the drug in 
New York had the drug company in California not exposed him to the drug in California.  
This scenario, however, clearly differs from the other examples where but-for causation has 
been found, when the defendant enters the contract in the forum and then the plaintiff gets 
injured somewhere else.  Here, the actual contract of sale for the drug occurs in New York.  
Id. 
 107  Richman, supra note 42, at 1344.  
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unfairness in allowing a court to assert personal jurisdiction in 
California.108 
D.  Hybrid Jurisdiction 
Professor Sandstrom Simard referred to “hybrid jurisdiction” as the 
grey area between general and specific jurisdiction.109  This Comment 
views Professor Sandstrom Simard’s concept of hybrid jurisdiction as an 
approach to the nexus requirement of specific jurisdiction under specific 
factual circumstances.110  When viewed as an interpretation of the nexus 
requirement, hybrid jurisdiction builds upon the similarity approach, as it 
does not require causation.111  Professor Sandstrom Simard characterized 
hybrid jurisdiction by relying on the following language found in a uniform 
long-arm statute: 
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who 
acts directly or by an agent . . . causing tortious injury in this 
state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does 
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered, in this state . . . .112 
Professor Sandstrom Simard further added that the contacts with the state 
must be shown to possibly “result in factual circumstances similar to those 
that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.”113  The key difference between 
hybrid jurisdiction and the similarity approach is that, while hybrid 
jurisdiction allows for mere similarity to satisfy the nexus requirement, as 
opposed to causation between the defendant’s contacts with the forum and 
the plaintiff’s claim, the injury itself must occur in the forum.114  Thus, like 
 
 108  Id. 
 109  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 563 (“[Hybrid Jurisdiction] appears to combine 
the requirements of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction without satisfying either 
type of jurisdiction completely.”). 
 110  Indeed, Professor Sandstrom Simard ultimately found hybrid jurisdiction to be most 
reconcilable with specific jurisdiction.  Id.  (“The Article suggests that although hybrid 
jurisdiction does not satisfy the traditional test for specific jurisdiction requiring a claim to 
‘arise out of’ the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum, some instances of hybrid 
jurisdiction may satisfy the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction and thus be 
constitutional.”). 
 111  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 588 (stating that in analyzing hybrid jurisdiction 
“we must consider whether the purposes and goals of specific jurisdiction can be satisfied in 
the absence of a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum 
contacts”).  
 112  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 562 (quoting Unif. Interstate and Int’l Procedure 
Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1962)).  
 113  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 589.  
 114  After Daimler AG v. Bauman (discussed below), Professors Rhodes and Robertson 
suggested a similar means of establishing specific jurisdiction.  Rhodes and Robertson, 
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the similarity approach, hybrid jurisdiction falls under Justice Brennan’s 
category of “relate to” as opposed to “arise out of.” 115 
Professor Sandstrom Simard pointed out that not many courts have 
explicitly adopted hybrid jurisdiction, but some have functionally used it.116  
For example, in Vermeulen v. Renault, the Eleventh Circuit found specific 
jurisdiction in a factual situation implicating hybrid jurisdiction.117  In 
Vermeulen, the plaintiff bought a used Renault vehicle in North Carolina.118  
She then moved to Georgia where she was involved in a car accident.119  
Renault regularly sold cars in Georgia, though the plaintiff did not buy her 
specific vehicle there.120  The plaintiff sued Renault in Georgia.121  The 
federal district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction; the 
 
supra note 77, at 240.  Their proposal, however, relies on Professor Brilmayer’s substantive 
relevance.  Rhodes and Robertson, supra note 77, at 237 (“Professor Brilmayer’s 
substantive relevance . . . is probably the best candidate.”).  Rhodes and Robertson noted 
that substantive relevance asks whether “any of the factual occurrences that are conditions 
for the claim,” including “injury . . . arose from the defendant’s actions within or directed at 
the forum.”  Id.  Therefore, when the injury occurs in a state that the defendant has 
continuous and similar contacts with, that state can assert personal jurisdiction because an 
element of the claim, “injury,” arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.  Id.  
This ends in the same result as hybrid jurisdiction.  Rhodes and Robertson’s proposal, 
however, used the word “arose,” which still seems to suggest that causation is needed, and 
thus creating tension within their proposal.  This Comment argues that hybrid jurisdiction is 
a more sound way of reaching the same goal, considering causation is necessarily lacking in 
the situations where either approach would allow a court to assert specific jurisdiction.  
Additionally, Robertson and Rhodes’ proposal differs from hybrid jurisdiction in that they 
also suggest that their formulation of substantive relevance be expanded to also allow a 
court to assert jurisdiction in a forum the defendant has continuous contacts in and that the 
plaintiff resides in even though they were not injured in the forum.  Rhodes and Robertson, 
supra note 77, at 242.  (“[I]f the defendant is conducting extensive forum activities similar 
to the episode in dispute, and the suit implicates another sovereign state interest (such as 
providing a convenient forum for state citizens or protecting against harms suffered in the 
state), the relevant state interests will typically outweigh the minimal litigation burdens on 
the defendant.”).  
 115  Professor Sandstrom Simard indicated that hybrid jurisdiction fails the nexus 
requirement completely, stating that hybrid jurisdiction does not “require the plaintiff’s 
cause of action to arise out of (or even relate to) the defendant’s forum contacts.”  
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 575.  Instead, Professor Sandstrom Simard argued that 
hybrid jurisdiction is constitutional, based on a functionalist argument that hybrid 
jurisdiction still achieves the constitutional rationales of specific jurisdiction, without 
necessarily fulfilling the formal nexus requirement. Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 
582–83.  Under Justice Brennan’s framework, there is no indication that hybrid jurisdiction 
cannot fit into his sweeping definition of “relate-to.”  Furthermore, as this comment later 
argues, hybrid jurisdiction likely fulfills the nexus requirement even under Bristol-Myers.  
Infra Sec. V. B.  
 116  See Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 602, 608.  
 117  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 601–02.  
 118  Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 975 F.2d 746, 748 (11th Cir. 1992).  
 119  Id.  
 120  Id. at 748–50.   
 121  Id. at 747. 
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Eleventh Circuit reversed.122 
The Eleventh Circuit found that Renault’s contacts with Georgia were 
“sufficiently related to [the plaintiff’s] cause of action to confer specific 
jurisdiction” because its “activities . . . were inextricable links in the 
advertising and distribution network by which the [plaintiff] obtained her 
vehicle . . . .”123  As Professor Sandstrom Simard argued, the Eleventh 
Circuit attempted to show a causal connection in its “inextricable link” 
argument, when in reality there was “no evidence of a causal link between 
the defendant’s contacts with Georgia and the plaintiff’s cause of 
action.”124  Therefore, while the court attempted to shoehorn its analysis to 
fit a causal test, its analysis more properly fit the requirements of hybrid 
jurisdiction. 
Another factual scenario where a court implicitly applied hybrid 
jurisdiction, though labeled it as general jurisdiction, is in Lemke v. St. 
Margaret Hospital.125  In Lemke, Dr. U.H Patel, a surgeon, worked for St. 
Margaret—a hospital based in Indiana.126  The hospital regularly advertised 
in Illinois.127  Dr. Patel treated the plaintiff’s son, an Illinois resident, in the 
Indiana hospital.128  The record, however, did not reveal any evidence that 
the plaintiff’s son came to St. Margaret because of the advertisements in 
Illinois.129  The plaintiff’s son returned to Illinois and then died because of 
alleged malpractice by Dr. Patel.130  The plaintiff sued the hospital and Dr. 
Patel in Illinois state court, and the defendants removed to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.131  Here, the facts created 
a textbook hybrid jurisdiction situation, as the defendant caused tortious 
injury in Illinois “by an act or omission outside [a] state” in which the 
defendant “regularly [conducted] or solicit[ed] business.”132  The court, 
however, asserted personal jurisdiction over the hospital by finding that the 
hospital’s solicitations in Illinois constituted strong enough contacts to 
implicate general jurisdiction.133 
 
 
 122  Id. at 747–48. 
 123  Id. at 760.  
 124  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 602.  
 125  Lemke v. St. Margaret Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982).  
 126  Id. at 835.  
 127  Id. at 835–36.  
 128  Id. at 835.  
 129  Id.  
 130  Id.  
 131  Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 835.  
 132  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 562 (quoting Unif. Interstate and Int’l Procedure 
Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1962)). 
 133  Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 838–39.  
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Professor Sandstrom Simard argued that applying hybrid jurisdiction 
would have been a much sounder approach, as the court unnecessarily 
diluted the meaning of general jurisdiction.134  Of course, in the wake of 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, the Illinois court would no longer be able to make such a strained 
general jurisdiction analysis, leaving hybrid jurisdiction or the similarity 
approach as the only way to assert jurisdiction in such a case.135 
IV. THE BRISTOL-MYERS OPINION136 
The opinion marked a narrowing of the above jurisprudence as to 
when a claim properly arises out of or relates to a defendant’s forum 
contacts.  The opinion implicitly rejected the similarity approach and 
explicitly rejected the sliding scale as a supplement to the similarity 
approach.  This Comment argues, however, that the opinion still leaves 
room for hybrid jurisdiction. 
A.  Situating the Opinion within the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Personal Jurisdiction Decisions 
Bristol-Myers did not occur in a vacuum; the opinion is part of a 
restrictive trend in the Supreme Court’s recent opinions.  Bristol-Myers is 
the sixth case in the past decade to mark a tightening by the Court in its 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.137  In two of these cases, J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Walden v. Fiore, the Court declined to 
exercise personal jurisdiction, finding a lack of minimum contacts.138  The 
Court also released three rulings that restricted the scope of general 
jurisdiction.139  Due to the important link between the nexus requirement 
and the concepts of specific and general jurisdiction, these decisions 
narrowing the scope of general jurisdiction are relevant in understanding 
the effect of Bristol-Myers.  Therefore, this section will begin with a brief 
review of Goodyear.140 
Goodyear involved a bus accident in France, allegedly connected to 
 
 134  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 608–09.  
 135  Infra Section IV. A. i. 
 136  The remainder of this Comment will refer to the Bristol-Myers opinion as “the 
opinion” or “Bristol-Myers.”   
 137  See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 
U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 
(2011). 
 138  Walden, 571 U.S. at 277; J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 873. 
 139  BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1549; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 117; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915. 
 140  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915.  
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defective tires that resulted in the deaths of two American children.141  The 
children’s parents sued Goodyear USA and three of Goodyear USA’s 
European subsidiaries142 in North Carolina.143  Goodyear USA, an Ohio 
corporation with plants in North Carolina, “regularly engaged in 
commercial activity” in the forum and did not contest jurisdiction.144  
Conversely, the three foreign subsidiaries (“petitioners”), which 
“manufacture tires primarily for sale in European and Asian Markets,” but 
whose products had been “distributed within North Carolina by other 
Goodyear USA affiliates,” contested personal jurisdiction.145 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendants 
and invoked general jurisdiction over petitioners.146  The Court of Appeals 
held that the petitioners’ contacts with North Carolina reached the 
threshold of general jurisdiction, “when petitioners placed their tires ‘in the 
stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the extent to which 
those tires could be sold in North Carolina.’”147  Moreover, the Court of 
Appeals found that the “tires made by petitioners reached North Carolina as 
a consequence of a ‘highly-organized distribution process’ involving other 
Goodyear USA subsidiaries.”148 
After the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review, the United 
States Supreme Court granted the defendants’ writ of certiorari and struck 
down the Court of Appeals’ assertion of general jurisdiction.149  The 
Supreme Court explained that a “stream of commerce” theory can often be 
invoked to prove contacts with a forum by a defendant acting outside the 
forum whose products reached the forum and caused an injury inside the 
forum; but such cases are specific jurisdiction cases.150  Here, however, the 
stream of commerce theory, which indicated that some of petitioner’s tires 
reached the forum, “f[e]ll far short of the ‘the continuous and systematic 
 
 141  Id. at 920.  
 142  The three Goodyear USA subsidiaries were organized in and operated out of 
Luxembourg, Turkey and France, respectively.  Id. at 918.  
 143  Id. 
 144  Id.  
 145  Id. at 918, 920–21 (“In contrast to . . . Goodyear USA . . . petitioners are not 
registered to do business in North Carolina.  They have no place of business, employees, or 
bank accounts in North Carolina.  They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their 
products in North Carolina.”).  
 146  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 921–22 (“Acknowledging that the claims neither ‘related to, 
nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] contacts with North Carolina,’ the Court of Appeals 
confined its analysis to ‘general rather than specific jurisdiction. . . .’”) (alterations in 
original). 
 147  Id. at 922.  
 148  Id.  
 149  Id. at 929.   
 150  Id. at 926.  
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general business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to 
entertain suit against [petitioners] on claims unrelated” to the forum.151 
Goodyear involved forum contacts by the defendants that constituted 
the kind of “continuous and systematic” general business contacts 
necessary to implicate general jurisdiction under prior case law.152  The 
Court’s language describing general jurisdiction in the early portion of the 
opinion, however, marked a potential narrowing of general jurisdiction.  
The majority explained that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign (sister-state or foreign country) corporations to hear any and all 
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous 
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 
State.”153  The Court cited to International Shoe for this proposition; 
however, International Shoe never used the words “essentially at home” to 
describe (what would become) general jurisdiction.154  The Court then 
elaborated that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of 
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at 
home,” which can include the place of incorporation or the principal place 
of business.155  Hence, the case suggested a conflation between “domicile,” 
a distinct method of asserting personal jurisdiction,156 and general 
jurisdiction, a subset of the minimum contacts method of asserting personal 
jurisdiction. 
This framework has now been further entrenched in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, as the Court reaffirmed the requirement that a corporation be 
“essentially at home” in Daimler AG v. Bauman.157 
 
 151  Id. at 929.  
 152  See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). 
 153  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 
(1945)) (emphasis added).  
 154  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“there have been instances in 
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.”).  While the Goodyear Court’s “essentially at home” 
language is a logical extension of this, it certainly marked a narrowing.  
 155  Goodyear, 564 U.S at 924 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General 
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728 (1988)).  
 156  Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (“Domicile in the state is alone 
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for 
purposes of a personal judgment . . . .”).  
 157  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).  In Daimler, the Court explained that 
“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a 
forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those 
places paradigm all-purpose forums.”  Id. at 137.  The Court, however, did not provide an 
example of when a court could assert general jurisdiction absent those examples, as it 
restated that the test for general jurisdiction is “not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum 
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B.  The Bristol-Myers Opinion 
1.  Facts of the Case 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) is a pharmaceutical company 
incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in New York, and with substantial 
operations in New Jersey.158  The company also operates in other states 
including California.159  At the time of Bristol-Myers, the company had five 
research labs and employed approximately 300 people in California.160  
One of BMS’s most popular drugs is a blood thinner called Plavix.161  
While BMS did not manufacture Plavix or develop marketing schemes for 
Plavix in California, it did sell a lot of Plavix there.162  Indeed, BMS sold 
approximately 187 million Plavix pills in California from 2006 through 
2012.163  This represented over $900 million in sales, about one percent of 
BMS’s nationwide sales.164 
Six hundred seventy-eight plaintiffs sued BMS in a mass tort action in 
California state court, alleging injuries linked to Plavix.165  Eighty-six of 
these plaintiffs were from California while the other 592 were from thirty-
three other states.166  Asserting various tort claims under California law, 
“[t]he nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix 
through California physicians or from any other California source; nor did 
they claim that they were injured by Plavix or treated for their injuries in 
California.”167 
2.  Procedural History 
BMS moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the 
nonresident claims.168  The California trial court denied this motion, finding 
that California could assert general jurisdiction over BMS because of its 
continuous business activity in the state.169  Hence, according to the 
California trial court, the claim did not have to relate to BMS’s activities in 
 
contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that 
corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] 
essentially at home in the forum State.’”  Id. at 138–39 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).  
 158  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777–78 (2017).  
 159  Id. at 1778.  
 160  Id.  
 161  Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 162  Id.  
 163  Id.  
 164  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.  
 165  Id.  
 166  Id.  
 167  Id.  
 168  Id.  
 169  Id.  
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California.170  The California court of appeals affirmed, but in response to 
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Daimler, which further 
limited general jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court reversed the 
court of appeals.171 
Instead of vacating its order asserting personal jurisdiction over BMS, 
the court of appeals changed its opinion and found that specific jurisdiction 
existed over BMS as to the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs.172  The 
California Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion by using the sliding 
scale approach, finding that “‘BMS’s extensive contacts with California 
permitted the exercise of specific jurisdiction ‘based on a less direct 
connection between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than 
might otherwise be required.’”173 
3.  The United States Supreme Court Opinion 
In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed 
the California Supreme Court.174  The Court began its analysis by 
describing the difference between general and specific jurisdiction.175  Here 
the Court once again reaffirmed the Goodyear framework for general 
jurisdiction.176  Then moving to specific jurisdiction the Court further 
explained: 
In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the 
suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum.’177  In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation 
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, 
[an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State 
and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’  For this 
reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues 
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 
establishes jurisdiction.’178 
 
 
 170  See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 171  Id.  
 172  Id.  
 173  Id. at 1779 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 889 
(2016)).  
 174  Id. at 1777.  
 175  Id. at 1779–80.  
 176  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (“‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place . . . .’”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). 
 177  Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct., at 754 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)) (emphasis added by the Court in Bristol-
Myers). 
 178  Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).  
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 Based on this standard, the Court held that its “settled principles 
regarding specific jurisdiction control this case.”179  The Court first 
dispensed with the California Supreme Court’s use of the sliding scale 
approach, holding that the approach “is difficult to square with our 
precedents.”180  Furthermore, the Court explained that this particular case 
exposes the danger of the sliding scale approach because “[t]he State 
Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was present without 
identifying any adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ 
claims.” 181 The Court defended this assertion by stating: 
[T]he nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did 
not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in 
California, and were not injured by Plavix in California.  The 
mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and 
ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same 
injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to 
assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims . . . .  
This remains true even when third parties (here, the plaintiffs 
who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those 
brought by the nonresidents . . . .  What is needed—and is 
missing here—is a connection between the forum and the 
specific claims at issue.182 
The Court then reversed the California Supreme Court’s assertion of 
specific jurisdiction and remanded for a decision not inconsistent with its 
opinion.183 
4.  Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent 
Although the majority opinion held that “settled principles regarding 
specific jurisdiction control this case,”184 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent 
suggests that it is not necessarily a straightforward application of 
precedent.185  Justice Sotomayor noted that the nexus requirement used to 
only require that the claim “relate to” the defendant’s contacts in the 
 
 179  Id. at 1781. As this comment later argues, this characterization of the law as “settled” 
seems somewhat strained, because the formulation the Court relies upon comes largely from 
dicta describing specific jurisdiction in Goodyear, a general jurisdiction case, which the 
Court decided only six years earlier.   
 180  Id. at 1781. (“[T]his approach . . . resembles a loose and spurious form of general 
jurisdiction.”).  
 181  Id.  
 182  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (emphasis in original).  
 183  Id. at 1784.  I have omitted the Court’s discussions of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) because 
those discussions do not directly pertain to the Court’s formulation of the nexus 
requirement. 
 184  Id. at 1781.  
 185  See id. at 1787–88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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forum.186  She then pointed out that the nonresidents’ claims “concern 
conduct materially identical” to the conduct that caused the residents’ 
claims; thus, the nonresidents’ claims “related to” BMS’s minimum 
contacts with California.187  As stated by Justice Sotomayor, “[o]ur cases 
require no connection more direct than that.”188 
Conversely, Justice Sotomayor noted that if a negligently maintained 
sidewalk outside of BMS’s New York office caused injury to a plaintiff, 
there would be no connection because the claim does not arise out of or 
relate to BMS’s pharmaceutical-related conduct in California.189  Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent, therefore, appears to approve of the similarity 
approach. 
As this Comment points out in the next section, Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent flags that the majority opinion was not necessarily a straightforward 
application of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  Instead, Bristol-Myers 
marked a narrowing of the nexus requirement, as it ultimately rejected the 
similarity approach. 
V.  EFFECT ON THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
Despite the Court’s indication that it decided Bristol-Myers through a 
“straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal 
jurisdiction,” this Comment suggests that the opinion altered the analysis 
under the nexus requirement.190  The classifications of the varying 
interpretations of the nexus requirement using Justice Brennan’s 
framework provides a frame of reference for the landscape of the nexus 
requirement.  Using these reference points, the opinion can now be applied 
to each of the interpretations of the nexus requirement to determine which 
interpretations have been affected by the opinion. 
First, under Justice Brennan’s framework, it is apparent that the Court 
in Bristol-Myers did not implicate or alter the meaning of “arise out of” 
because BMS’s contacts in California did not give rise to an element of the 
nonresidents’ prima facie case.191  Moving to the more inclusive “relate to” 
portion of the nexus requirement, Bristol-Myers did not affect the causal 
approaches because the nonresidents’ claims were not caused by BMS’s 
contacts in California.192  On the other hand, as the next section will 
 
 186  Id. at 1786.  
 187  Id.  
 188  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.   
 189  Id.  
 190  Id. at 1783.  
 191  Id. at 1781.  
 192  Id.  The opinion avoided the question of which causation approach (but-for or 
proximate) due process may require, as it dispensed with the argument that BMS contracted 
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explain, the opinion clearly stamped out the similarity approach as well as 
the sliding scale approach, at least as far as the sliding scale approach may 
be used to supplement the similarity approach.  This Comment argues, 
however, that the opinion did not categorically reject a non-causal 
approach, as the opinion still likely left room for hybrid jurisdiction. 
A.  The Sliding Scale Approach and Similarity Approach 
Though short of explicitly calling the sliding scale approach 
unconstitutional in all facets, the opinion clearly did not look favorably on 
the approach and certainly invalidated its use in a non-causal context.193  
Indeed, some commenters have taken the opinion to mean that the sliding 
scale approach has been rejected outright.194  The opinion, however, still 
arguably leaves room for the implementation of the sliding scale, providing 
there is an “adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ 
claims.”195  The Court appeared to only take issue with the sliding scale 
approach because it allowed the California Supreme Court to “f[i]nd that 
specific jurisdiction was present without identifying any adequate 
link . . . .”196  Hence, the opinion does not allow a court to use the sliding 
scale to create an “adequate link.”197  While the opinion did not define what 
an “adequate link” must consist of, the Court’s language immediately 
following its insistence on an “adequate link” provides some clarity.  The 
Court pointed out that “the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in 
California [nor did they] purchase Plavix in California . . . .”198  This 
language potentially provides examples of what would have constituted a 
necessary “adequate link.”  These examples provide factual scenarios 
where, under the but-for causation approach, a court would be able to assert 
 
“with a California company . . . to distribute [Plavix] nationally,” on evidentiary grounds.  
Id. at 1783.  Had the Court found that BMS did in fact use a California company as a means 
of nationally distributing Plavix, and that a nonresident claimant was injured by a pill the 
California company distributed, then the opinion would have implicated the causation 
approaches.  Had this been the case, the Court would have likely needed to decide whether 
the causal connection between BMS and the nonresident, through the California distributor, 
was strong enough to assert specific jurisdiction.  The Court did not perform this type of 
analysis.  Hence, the causation approaches are constitutionally unaffected by the opinion.  
 193  Id. at 1781. 
 194  Personal Jurisdiction, 30 APPELLATE ADVOCATE 9, 32 (2017) (“The United States 
Supreme Court reversed and . . . clearly rejected the sliding scale standard . . . .”).  
 195  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (emphasis added).  The remainder of this Comment 
will use the term “adequate link” as a short hand for “an adequate link between the State and 
the nonresidents’ claims” or, alternatively stated, “a connection between the forum and the 
specific claims at issue.”  Id.  
 196  Id.  
 197  If it did allow the sliding scale to create a connection between the claim and the 
forum, the Court would not have found that such a connection was missing.  See id.   
 198  Id.  
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personal jurisdiction.199  Therefore, one can speculate that a causal 
connection between the plaintiff’s claim and the forum would constitute an 
“adequate link.” 
This suggests that the sliding scale approach may remain viable as a 
supplement to the but-for causation approach.  If perhaps the causal 
connection between the plaintiff’s claim and the forum is attenuated, but 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum are very strong, a court may use 
the sliding scale’s logic to find that the stronger contacts have the effect of 
allowing specific jurisdiction despite a relatively weak causal connection.  
Or conversely, if there is a weak causal connection and the defendant also 
has weak contacts with the forum, a court could slide the other way, finding 
that the connection is not adequate. 
Nonetheless, the opinion clearly rejects the sliding scale approach 
when used to supplement the similarity approach, considering that this is 
the exact way the California Supreme Court used the sliding scale 
approach.200  Therefore, the Court also necessarily rejected the pure 
similarity approach as a potential means of creating an “adequate link.”201  
Without the similarity approach, the opinion only leaves the causation 
approaches, and potentially hybrid jurisdiction,202 as viable interpretations 
of the nexus requirement.  Considering that hybrid jurisdiction, only 
operates under narrowly specified circumstances, Bristol-Myers has 
reasonably mandated that causation between the defendant’s forum 
contacts and the plaintiff’s claim must serve as the necessary “connection 
between the forum and the specific claims at issue” in the vast majority of 
cases.203 
B.  Hybrid Jurisdiction 
Though the Court has clearly disallowed similarity between the 
defendant’s continuous forum contacts and the defendant’s non-forum 
 
 199  See supra Sec. III. A.  Had a nonresident plaintiff bought or been prescribed Plavix 
in California and then been injured anywhere in the world, under the but-for causation test 
espoused in Carnival Cruise, the nonresident would be able to sue BMS in California.  
Indeed, the facts would be analogous to Carnival Cruise in which the plaintiff entered a 
contract in the forum and then became injured as a result of that contract.  Shute v. Carnival 
Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 200  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“[T]he California Supreme Court’s ‘sliding scale 
approach’ is difficult to square with our precedents. . . . Our cases provide no support for 
this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”).  
 201  Id. (Stating that a connection between the defendant and a “third party . . . is an 
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. . . . [And] [t]his remains true even when third parties 
(here, the plaintiffs who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those brought by 
the nonresidents.”) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
 202  The next section discusses this possibility in depth.  
 203  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  
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contacts that caused the plaintiff’s claim to constitute an “adequate link,” 
the Court did not necessarily rule out hybrid jurisdiction.  Significantly, 
Professor Sandstrom Simard’s formulation, while requiring similarity 
between the forum and non-forum contacts, requires an additional 
“connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue:”204 the 
injury must occur inside the forum.205 
The facts that implicate hybrid jurisdiction are different from the 
factual situation in Bristol-Myers.  Bristol-Myers could have implicated 
hybrid jurisdiction had a nonresident who bought Plavix in a state other 
than California, subsequently traveled to California where her injury then 
occurred.  Everything else remains the same in that (1) BMS’s contacts 
with California did not cause the injury, (2) BMS has strong contacts with 
California, and (3) those contacts are similar or identical to the activities 
that caused the injury.  The only key difference is that the injury occurs in 
California.  By altering the facts in this way, Bristol-Myers would be 
directly analogous to the facts in Renault and Lemke, the two cases 
Professor Simard used to illustrate hybrid jurisdiction.206 
While Bristol-Myers does not deal with this factual scenario, language 
in the opinion suggests that under this factual scenario specific jurisdiction 
would be valid despite a non-causal connection between the defendant’s 
forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.  This language comes, once again, 
from the Court’s insistence on an “adequate link.”207  While this Comment 
has already argued that a causal connection between the defendant’s forum 
contacts and the plaintiff’s claim constitutes an “adequate link,” the opinion 
also left open the possibility that injury in the forum could create an 
“adequate link,” even without a causal connection between the defendant’s 
forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim. 
First, in defining the nexus requirement, the Court stated that “there 
must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, 
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence, that takes place in the forum 
State . . . .”208  An injury in the forum would likely constitute an activity or 
occurrence in the forum.  Furthermore, the opinion noticeably deviated 
from the standard definition of the nexus requirement.  While the Court in 
Helicopteros defined the nexus requirement as fulfilled “in a suit arising 
out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,”209 the Bristol-
Myers Court stated that the connection must be between the plaintiff’s 
 
 204  Id.  
 205  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 606.  
 206  Infra Sec. III. D.  
 207  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  
 208  Id. at 1780 (emphasis added).  
 209  Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 n.8 (1984).  
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claim and the forum.210  This suggests that an injury in the forum, while not 
causally connected to the defendant’s forum contacts, still fulfills the nexus 
requirement, as the plaintiff’s claim is quite persuasively connected to the 
forum, when the injury occurred there. 
Additionally, in explaining why an “adequate link” was missing, the 
Court noted that “the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, 
did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, 
and were not injured by Plavix in California.”211  This language, at the very 
least, suggests that an injury in the forum is a relevant fact to consider.  
Furthermore, the first two missing connections, listed by the Bristol-Myers 
Court, between the nonresidents’ claims and the forum clearly implicate a 
causal relationship between a plaintiffs’ claim and the forum.212  Thus, 
because the first two items on the list would likely constitute an “adequate 
link,” one can infer that the second two items on the list would also 
independently constitute an “adequate link.”213  On the other hand, this list 
could have been a rhetorical flourish by the Court.  This language could 
simply have been a list of all the ways by which the nonresidents’ claims 
were completely unrelated to California as a means of bolstering the 
Court’s ultimate holding.214  Therefore, this language serves as a marker 
that the Court can later use in a case that potentially implicates hybrid 
jurisdiction if it chooses to adopt the theory.  Otherwise, the Court can 
conceivably dismiss this language as dicta.  As of now, however, this 
language keeps the possibility of hybrid jurisdiction viable. 
The recent opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bandemer v. 
Ford Motor Company and the opinion of the Montana Supreme Court in 
Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, both of 
 
 210  Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  
 211  Id. (emphasis added).   
 212  Both situations would clearly pass the but-for causation test.  
 213  The opinion, however, does not appear to leave room for Rhodes and Robertson’s 
more expansive suggestion.  Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 77, at 240.  The opinion 
requires an “adequate link” or “connection between the forum and the specific claims at 
issue,” not between the plaintiff and the forum.  Thus, simply being a resident of California 
would likely not save jurisdiction had the individual bought, used, and became injured by 
Plavix in another state.  See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  Nonetheless, the spirit of 
Rhodes and Robertson’s proposed test is generally supported by Bristol-Myers. 
 214  Some commenters potentially agree that the Court intended the opinion to strictly 
require causation.  Bender, supra note 6.  
[Bristol-Myers’] insistence on the paramount importance of a clear 
connection between the defendant’s in-forum activities and the plaintiff’s 
particular claim suggests that the Court is likely to reject assertions of 
jurisdiction based only on contacts that are “related to” the cause of action 
but where the cause of action does not truly “arise out of” defendant’s 
activities in the forum.   
Id.   
KLINGER-CHRISTIANSEN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2020  7:31 PM 
2020] COMMENT 1173 
which the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari, further 
support the viability of hybrid jurisdiction.215 
In Bandemer, the plaintiff, Adam Bandemer, was a passenger in a 
1994 Ford Crown Victoria that crashed into a ditch in Minnesota after the 
driver rear-ended a snowplow.216  The plaintiff alleged that he suffered 
severe brain injuries because the vehicle’s airbags failed to deploy.217  The 
particular Ford vehicle involved in the crash “was designed in Michigan; 
assembled in 1993 in Ontario, Canada; and sold in Bismarck, North Dakota 
in 1994.”218  After going through the hands of four different owners, the 
vehicle was registered in Minnesota in 2011 and then re-registered by a 
fifth owner, the father of the driver in the January 2015 crash injuring 
Bandemer, in 2013.219  At the time of the accident, Ford had sold more than 
2,000 1994 Crown Victoria cars, and approximately 200,000 other vehicles 
in 2013, 2014, and 2015 to dealerships in Minnesota.220  Ford also regularly 
advertised its vehicles in Minnesota.221  These facts directly implicate 
hybrid jurisdiction, as Ford’s Montana contacts, while related to 
Bandemer’s injury in Montana, did not cause Bandemer’s injury in 
Montana. 
Ford challenged personal jurisdiction, and both the district court and 
court of appeals held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ford 
was proper.222  The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, first finding that 
Ford made sufficient minimum contacts with the Minnesota through Ford’s 
sales and advertising in the state.223 
The Minnesota Supreme Court then moved to the question of whether 
there was a “connection [between] the cause of action [and] Ford’s contacts 
with the state.”224  In ultimately finding that there was a connection, and 
thus the nexus requirement fulfilled, the court specifically rejected Ford’s 
argument for the court to “adopt a causal standard for this prong, under 
which the defendant’s contacts with Minnesota must have caused the 
plaintiff’s claims for personal jurisdiction over the defendant to be 
 
 215  Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 
WL 254152 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-369); Ford Motor Co., v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. 
Ct., 443 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL 254155 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 
19-368).   
 216  Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748. 
 217  Id. 
 218  Id. at 757–58 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 219  Id. at 758 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 220  Id. at 748.  
 221  Id.  
 222  Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748. 
 223  Id. at 750–51. 
 224  Id. at 751. 
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proper.”225  The court further rejected Ford’s argument that Bristol-Myers 
compelled a causation approach.226  Specifically, the court distinguished the 
case from Bristol-Myers noting that the Court in Bristol-Myers 
“specifically mentioned the lack of injury to [the] plaintiffs in California, 
and concluded that ‘a connection between the forum and the specific claims 
at issue’ was ‘missing.’”227  The Minnesota Supreme Court took this 
language from Bristol-Myers to mean that a “plaintiff’s contacts are 
relevant to the analysis of the ‘affiliation between the forum and the 
underlying controversyFalse’”228  Thus, the court concluded that there was 
“a substantial connection between the defendant Ford, the forum 
Minnesota, and the claims brought by Bandemer,” despite the existence of 
a non-causal relationship between Ford’s contacts in Minnesota and 
Bandemer’s claim.229  The Bandemer opinion, tracked hybrid jurisdiction’s 
requirements and ultimately applied a functional version of hybrid 
jurisdiction.  Significantly, the opinion reconciled this approach with 
Bristol-Myers.  As the next section articulates, it would be unfair for a court 
to be unable to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a case like 
Bandemer.  Thus, the United States Supreme Court should affirm the 
Minnesota Supreme Court by embracing hybrid jurisdiction when it 
decides Bandemer. 
 
 
 225  Id. at 751–52 (internal quotations and insertions omitted).  
 226  Id. at 752–54.  
 227  Id. at 754 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017)).  The Montana Supreme Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial 
District Court, distinguished Bristol-Myers on the same basis.  Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 417 (Mont. 2019).  Ford, involved nearly identical 
material facts to Bandemer, as the case involved a 1996 Ford Explorer that crashed in 
Montana due to an alleged defect in the vehicle’s tires.  Id. at 411.  The specific Ford 
Explorer involved in the crash was not designed, manufactured, nor sold by Ford in 
Montana.  Id.  Instead, Ford originally sold the vehicle in Washington State, and the vehicle 
was eventually resold in Montana.  Id.  Similar to Bandemer, at the time of the crash, Ford 
otherwise did business in Montana.  Id. at 414.  Specifically, the company sold Ford 
Explorers to dealerships in Montana.  Id.  In deciding that Montana could validly assert 
specific jurisdiction over Ford, the Montana Supreme distinguished Bristol-Myers noting 
that the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers “were not injured by Plavix in California,” while the 
plaintiff in Ford, “was injured while driving the Explorer in Montana.”  Id. at 417 (quoting 
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781).  Thus, the Montana Supreme Court held that Bristol-
Myers did “not impact [the court’s] analysis regarding whether [the plaintiff’s] claims relate 
to Ford’s Montana contacts because [the plaintiff] was injured while driving the Explorer in 
Montana.”  Id.  Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court functionally applied hybrid 
jurisdiction.   
 228  Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 754 (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781).  
 229  Id. at 755.  
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VI. THE COURT SHOULD EMBRACE HYBRID JURISDICTION 
Having established that the possibility of hybrid jurisdiction remains 
viable, indeed the only viable means of asserting non-causal specific 
jurisdiction, this Comment now argues that embracing the approach would 
be a prudent decision.  Without, this non-causal reading of “relate to,” 
patently unfair results could follow.  This unfairness can be demonstrated 
by the result that would follow if a causation only approach is applied to 
the classic case World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.230 
In World-Wide, plaintiffs Harry and Kay Robinson bought an Audi 
vehicle from a car dealer in Massena, New York in 1976.231  The next year, 
the Robinsons left New York to live in Arizona.232  While the Robinsons 
were driving through Oklahoma on their way to Arizona, another car 
crashed into the Robinsons’ Audi vehicle.233  The crash caused a fire, 
which severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children.234 
The question before the Court was whether Oklahoma could assert 
personal jurisdiction over the local car dealership in Massena and the 
regional car distributor.235  The Supreme Court ultimately said no, because 
the car only reached Oklahoma through the unilateral activity of the 
plaintiffs, and thus those defendants had no qualifying minimum contacts 
with Oklahoma.236  The Robinsons, however, also sued Audi, a German 
corporation, in Oklahoma, and Audi, did not contest jurisdiction.237  Had 
Audi challenged personal jurisdiction, under the post-Goodyear and 
Bristol-Myers landscape the only viable way to assert jurisdiction over 
Audi would be if courts embrace hybrid jurisdiction.  Furthermore, it would 
be fundamentally unfair to shield Audi from suit in Oklahoma under such 
facts.   
Under modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, had Audi 
challenged personal jurisdiction, the only means of establishing personal 
jurisdiction over Audi under these facts would be through hybrid 
jurisdiction.  Goodyear and Daimler heavily suggest that general 
jurisdiction over Audi would not be viable because Audi was not 
incorporated in Oklahoma, did not have its principal place of business in 
Oklahoma, and, similar to Daimler, Audi’s sale of cars in Oklahoma would 
 
 230  World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
 231  Id. at 288.  
 232  Id.  
 233  Id.  
 234  Id.  
 235  Id. at 295–96.  
 236  World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295–96. 
 237  See id. at 288 n.3. 
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not render the corporation “essentially at home” in Oklahoma.238  Hence, 
the only way to assert jurisdiction over Audi would be through specific 
jurisdiction.  If this specific jurisdiction were subsequently limited to 
requiring causation between the defendant’s forum contacts and the 
plaintiff’s claim, jurisdiction would be lacking.  There was no causal 
connection between Audi’s sales in Oklahoma and Robinson’s car 
accident.  Because the Robinsons bought the car in New York, not 
Oklahoma, this would not even pass a but-for causation test.  Thus, a non-
causal test would be needed, and here the facts fit the requirements of the 
hybrid jurisdiction model on all fours.  Indeed, Professor Sandstrom 
Simard used the facts of World-Wide in support of the assertion of hybrid 
jurisdiction.239 
The facts of World Wide present the most compelling reason for 
adopting hybrid jurisdiction as an approach to the nexus requirement.  
Without it, unjust results would follow.  It would be unfair to not hold Audi 
liable in Oklahoma where it regularly sells cars, benefits from the laws of 
the state, and can readily foresee lawsuits in the forum.  Furthermore, to not 
do so would effectively protect companies like Audi from suit altogether.  
If, for instance, the Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction over Audi, 
the Robinsons would only be able to bring their claim in New York or 
Audi’s principal place of business, Germany.  This would make it nearly 
impossible for the Robinsons to bring suit, when all of the accident and 
medical witnesses were in Oklahoma.  The added expense of bringing these 
witnesses to New York could very well render a proceeding prohibitively 
expensive for many litigants. 
The most plausible counter-argument for rejecting the hybrid 
jurisdiction model is that, like all tests not based on causation, it presents 
risks of unfairness to the defendant and forum shopping.240  Any fear of 
forum shopping, however, can be dismissed in such a situation, because the 
injury itself happened in the forum.  In other words, the “adequate link” of 
the injury occurring in the forum prevents an arbitrary choice of forum. 
 
 238  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014) (stating that the test for 
general jurisdiction “is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to 
be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations 
with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the 
forum State.’”(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
919 (2011)).  
 239  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 600.  This hypothetical has been the impetus for 
other commenters to suggest tests similar to hybrid jurisdiction.  Indeed, Rhodes and 
Robertson relied on the facts of World-Wide to support their nexus requirement approach.  
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 77, at 240–41. 
 240  Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 84 (“the similarity test would apparently have to allow 
jurisdiction in any State in the country where the defendant has engaged in similar 
activities . . . [this is] extremely elastic and lead[s] to dubious results.”). 
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VII. STILL A QUESTION OF SIMILARITY WITHIN THE HYBRID JURISDICTION 
FRAMEWORK 
Providing courts do adopt the hybrid approach as a narrow reading of 
“relate to,” a difficult question will still remain.  Like all “relate to” 
interpretations, there is still a similarity component within the hybrid 
approach.  As Professor Sandstrom Simard noted the continuous contacts 
must be those that “could result in factual circumstances similar to those 
that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.”241  The Bristol-Myers opinion does 
not hinge on similarity, and even if the injury occurred in the forum and a 
court found an “adequate link,” similarity would not be an issue because 
the conduct was identical to the conduct that gave rise to the claim.  But 
what if BMS did not sell Plavix in California but sold other similar drugs?  
The hybrid approach would necessarily need clarifying as to what degree of 
similarity is required.242 
A difficult factual scenario would not be hard to imagine either.  
Indeed, the facts of Goodyear could implicate the problem.243  Altering the 
facts of Goodyear, imagine the bus accident occurred in North Carolina, 
instead of France.  Next, assume that Goodyear USA produced the 
defective tires in the accident, rather than the three foreign subsidiaries.  
Furthermore, assume that Goodyear USA had continuous contacts with 
North Carolina, but was not essentially at home there.  Providing Goodyear 
sells the exact type of tire in North Carolina, the case would implicate a 
paradigmatic example of when hybrid jurisdiction would be useful.  But 
what if Goodyear did not sell the same type of tire in North Carolina?244  
Here, the defendant’s contacts with the forum would be similar but not 
identical to the activities that caused the injury.  Deciding the degree of 
similarity required will necessarily be a question in need of clarification if 
courts come to fully embrace the hybrid approach. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Bristol-Myers has absolutely marked a change in personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence. Bristol-Myers has clearly limited the breadth of the nexus 
requirement to largely requiring causation between the forum and the 
plaintiff’s claim.  The opinion, however, still leaves room for Professor 
Simard’s concept of hybrid jurisdiction, which does not require causation 
 
 241  Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 589.  
 242  Rhodes and Robertson similarly point out this issue in their proposal.  Rhodes & 
Robertson, supra note 77, at 242.  
 243  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920–23. 
 244  This was the actual scenario in Goodyear.  Id. at 921 (“[T]he type of tire involved in 
the accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, was never 
distributed in North Carolina.”).  
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between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim under narrow 
circumstances.  In order to ensure fairness in the rapidly diminishing realm 
of personal jurisdiction, courts ought to embrace this limited non-causal 
approach in Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co. and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
Eighth Judicial District Court. 
 
